

# 哲學系九十一學年度博士班招生英文試題

請將以下畫底線之英文翻譯成中文：

1. It is now more than twenty years since the appearance of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. For many of us entering the field two decades ago, that book made a powerful difference. Not because we fully understood it; still less because we became converts to it. It mattered, rather, because it posed in a particularly vivid form some direct challenges to the empiricism we were learning from the likes of Hempel, Nagel, Popper, and Carnap.

Philosophers of science of that era had no doubts about whom and what the book was attacking. If Kuhn was right, all the then reigning methodological orthodoxies were simply wrong. It was a good deal less clear what Kuhn's positive message amounted to, and not entirely because many of Kuhn's philosophical readers were too shocked to read him carefully. Was he saying that theories were really and always incommensurable so that rival scientists invariably misunderstood one another, or did he mean it when he said that the problem-solving abilities of rival theories could be objectively compared? Did he really believe that accepting a new theory was a "conversion experience," subject only to the Gestalt-like exigencies of the religious life? In the first wave of reaction to Kuhn's bombshell, answers to such questions were not easy to find.

Since 1962 most of Kuhn's philosophical writings have been devoted to clearing up some of the ambiguities and confusions generated by the language of the first edition of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. By and large, Kuhn's message has been an ameliorative and concilia-

2. One final word. Not one word of the argumentation in this book should be construed as opposing serious research into the physical basis of our mental life. Indeed, some of the best work into that basis has been done by scientists who are well aware of the difference between finding physical processes that subserve thought, feeling, memory, perception, and so on, and reductionist claims (whether the latter take the form of insisting that thought, feeling, etc., are "identical" with brain processes or they take the "eliminative materialist" form of regarding the whole of ordinary mentalistic vocabulary as so much bosh). Not only does rejecting reductionist pictures *not* entail abandoning serious scientific research but, in fact, it is those pictures that often lead researchers to misconceive the empirical problems.

Here is an example of such a misconception: on a recent trip to Europe I had a conversation with a respected neuroscientist. We were talking about *The Remembered Present* by the American neuroscientist Gerald Edelman – a book I very much admire and one that is quite clear on the defects of reductionism – and my conversation partner said something that puzzled me.

"I didn't find anything in the book about *consciousness*," said he.

Now the overall topic of Edelman's book is precisely the neurological basis of consciousness, and the book offers neurological models in connection with an amazing number of topics; in one case (pattern recognition) one suffi-

3. One might hope that this inward retreat is only temporary. Take a particular case in which it looks to me as if things are a certain way. If things are indeed that way, that is—so far—a favour the world is doing me. The hope is that I might start from the fact that things look that way to me; add in anything else that the ground rules allow me to avail myself of, if it helps; and move from there, by my own unaided resources, without needing the world to do me any favours, to a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons with respect to the fact that the world is arranged the way it looks. And now that would no longer be a favour the world is doing me, a kindness I must simply hope for. Now I would have a derivatively satisfactory standing in the space of reasons, with respect to the fact that things are as they look, that I achieved by myself without needing to be indebted to the world.

4. It is always the aim of skepticism to expose hidden ignorance. It is not, in fact, difficult to show that laws inspire false intellectual self-assurance that positively encourages us to be unjust. The great skeptics doubted that law-governed conduct could be effective or even possible because we simply cannot know enough about men or events to fulfill its demands. That is why Plato turned his back on the normal model, while Augustine and Montaigne reduced its relevance. All of them had an unusually enlarged sense of the various forms of injustice, and even though they did not focus on the personal sense of injustice, as more democratic theorists eventually would, they gave the theory of injustice its main structure and its intellectual force.

These skeptics did not, of course, deny that lawlessness, crime, and unfairness in exchanges and in judging were acts of wrongdoing, but they looked beyond these obvious misdeeds to rediscover injustice itself in its scope and endless detail. They saw it

5. The copy theory in its various forms stands closer to the main philosophical tradition, and to the attitude of common sense today. Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. To switch languages is to change the labels. Now the naturalist's primary objection to this view is not an objection to meanings on account of their being mental entities, though that could be objection enough. The primary objection persists even if we take the labeled exhibits not as mental ideas but as Platonic ideas or even as the denoted concrete objects. Semantics is vitiated by a pernicious mentalism as long as we regard a man's semantics as somehow determinate in his mind beyond what might be implicit in his dispositions to overt behavior. It is the very facts about meaning, not the entities meant, that must be construed in terms of behavior.